THE QUANTUM INTELLIGENCER

Comparative Analysis and Strategic Roadmap for China's Quantum-Resistant Cryptography Deployment: A Dual-Track PQC and QKD Approach In Plain English: This paper addresses the urgent problem that powerful quantum computers could eventually break today's digital security systems, putting national secrets and critical infrastructure at risk. The researchers compared how China and the United States are preparing for this threat, finding that America has stronger standard systems while China has better engineering capabilities. They propose a clear three-to-ten year plan for China to build comprehensive security protections that combine new mathematical algorithms with quantum-based key exchange technology, ensuring the country's digital safety in the quantum computing era. Summary: This paper proposes a comprehensive strategy for China to address quantum computing threats through a dual-track approach combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD). The study compares US and Chinese approaches, finding that the US has established a closed-loop system based on FIPS standards with mandatory migration initiatives, while China leads in QKD engineering but lags in PQC standardization. The authors propose a three-phase roadmap: three years for standardization, five years for large-scale migration, and ten years for international consolidation. The strategy includes a five-layer governance structure and emphasizes achieving international interoperability while safeguarding national security and industrial resilience. Key Points: - Quantum computing poses a "interception first, decryption later" threat to current encryption systems - Dual-track approach: PQC as "basic defense line" and QKD as "enhanced defense line" - US has established FIPS 203/204/205 standards with mandatory migration programs - China leads in QKD engineering but lacks solidified PQC national standards - Proposed three-year standardization, five-year migration, ten-year internationalization timeline - Five-tier governance structure led by State Cryptography Administration - Need for international interoperability while maintaining national security Notable Quotes: - "PQC must be established as the 'basic defence line' in the quantum era, while QKD should serve as the 'enhanced defence line' for critical links" - "China must complete the construction of PQC national standards and migration governance capabilities within a three-year standardisation, five-year consolidation, and ten-year internationalisation timeline" - "The United States has established a closed-loop system of 'primary standards + redundancy' based on FIPS 203/204/205 and HQC backup algorithms" Data Points: - Three-year standardization timeline - Five-year migration and verification timeline - Ten-year consolidation and internationalization timeline - FIPS 203/204/205 standards referenced - Five-tier governance structure proposed - Reference to HQC backup algorithms in US system Controversial Claims: - The assertion that China's QKD engineering leadership compensates for PQC standardization gaps may be debated, as some experts question the practical scalability of QKD versus mathematical PQC solutions. The proposed three-year timeline for standardization may be optimistic given the complexity of cryptographic standardization processes. The paper's national security focus might overlook broader international collaboration opportunities in cryptographic standards development. Technical Terms: - PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography), QKD (Quantum Key Distribution), FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards), NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), OMB (Office of Management and Budget), CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency), TC260/TC485 (Technical Committees), PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), KPI (Key Performance Indicators), HQC (algorithm), migration ecosystem, international interoperability, key lifecycle management —Inspector Grey Dispatch from Migration Phase E2